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Abstract: This article consider three aspects of the damages regime under the tenancy 
deposit scheme: the number of tenancies in respect of which damages might be payable; 
whether breaches of Housing Act 2004 s.213(3) and (6) found separate causes of action; and 
how judges might exercise their discretion in deciding upon which damages multiplier to 
apply 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 The usefulness of the tenancy deposit scheme (hereafter ‘tds’) to assured shorthold tenants 
facing a possession claim under the Housing Act 1988 s.21 is now widely known and 
relatively straightforward to apply. A landlord who has taken a deposit and failed to comply 
with the various requirements of the Housing Act 2004 s.213 is precluded by s.215 from 
giving a s.21 notice until such time as she/he has paid the deposit back.  
 The scope of the tds as a defence to a s.21 claim was narrowed a little by an amendment to 
the 2004 Act by the Deregulation Act 2015. That amendment was directed at the Court of 
Appeal’s judgment in Superstrike v Rodrigues.1 Superstrike is discussed in more detail 
below, but in short terms the Court of Appeal held that the consequence of Housing Act 1998 
s.5 was that when a fixed term assured shorthold tenancy (hereafter ‘AST’) expired and 
became a periodic tenancy on the same terms, a ‘new’ tenancy had been created, and even if 
the landlord had complied with the tds requirements at the outset of the fixed term AST, 
those requirements were imposed anew in respect of the periodic AST. 
 The Conservative/Liberal coalition government took the view that this worked a significant 
injustice on landlords who had in good faith taken the proper steps to comply with the 
scheme, and so promoted an amendment to Housing Act 2004 s.215 which introduced a form 
of ‘deemed compliance’ with the tds. In essence, in circumstances where there are several 
ASTs between the same landlord and tenant in respect of the same premises (whether through 
the operation of Housing Act 1988 s.5 or by the grant of new fixed term ASTs), compliance 
by the landlord with the tds in respect of a past tenancy is deemed to carry over to any 
subsequent tenancy. 
 This article is concerned with the use that can be made of the tds as an effective means of 
defence by way of counterclaim to a possession claim based on rent arrears, and as a 
                                                          
1
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Lawyer 60: E. Humphries, “Another blow for AST landlords” (2013) Estates Gazette (1432) 53. 
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freestanding cause of action on the tenant’s part. The damages element of the scheme lies in 
s.214. In its present form, s.214 provides that: 
 
214 Proceedings relating to tenancy deposits 
(1) Where a tenancy deposit has been paid in connection with a shorthold tenancy on or after 6 April 2007 , the 
tenant or any relevant person (as defined by section 213(10) ) may make an application to the county court  on 
the grounds–  
(a) that section 213(3) or (6) has not been complied with in relation to the deposit, or 
(b) that he has been notified by the landlord that a particular authorised scheme applies to the deposit but has 
been unable to obtain confirmation from the scheme administrator that the deposit is being held in accordance 
with the scheme. 
(1A) Subsection (1) also applies in a case where the tenancy has ended, and in such a case the reference in 
subsection (1) to the tenant is to a person who was a tenant under the tenancy. 
(2) Subsections (3) and (4)  apply in the case of an application under subsection (1) if the tenancy has not ended 
and the court–  
(a) is satisfied that section 213(3) or (6) has not been complied with in relation to the deposit, or 
(b) is not satisfied that the deposit is being held in accordance with an authorised scheme, 
as the case may be. 
(2A) Subsections (3A) and (4) apply in the case of an application under subsection (1) if the tenancy has ended 
(whether before or after the making of the application) and the court— 
(a) is satisfied that section 213(3) or (6) has not been complied with in relation to the deposit, or 
(b) is not satisfied that the deposit is being held in accordance with an authorised scheme, 
as the case may be. 
(3) The court must, as it thinks fit, either– 
(a) order the person who appears to the court to be holding the deposit to repay it to the applicant, or 
(b) order that person to pay the deposit into the designated account held by the scheme administrator under an 
authorised custodial scheme, 
within the period of 14 days beginning with the date of the making of the order. 
(3A) The court may order the person who appears to the court to be holding the deposit to repay all or part of it 
to the applicant within the period of 14 days beginning with the date of the making of the order. 
(4) The court must order the landlord to pay to the applicant a sum of money not less than the amount of the 
deposit and not more than three times the amount of the deposit within the period of 14 days beginning with the 
date of the making of the order…  
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This aspect of the tds is a little more complicated than the scheme’s role as a defence in s.21 
proceedings. Three distinct issues arise in respect of s.214. The first is the question of ‘how 
many tenancies’ can s.214 be applied to? The second is whether breaches of s.213(3) and 
s.213(6) raise separate or combined  causes of action ? The third is what factors control the 
court’s discretion per s.214(4) in assessing where on the range between 1 and 3 times the 
deposit the appropriate quantum of damages should lie? 
 
 
The number of tenancies 
 
 This question comes into play in part because of s.5 of the Housing Act 1988, in part because 
of common practice among landlords and tenants in the AST sector, and in part because of 
what is likely to have been a legislative oversight in the amendment to the tenancy deposit 
scheme enacted following the Court of Appeal’s judgment in Superstrike. 
  The s.5 point arises because s.5 provides that on the expiry of the initial time span of a fixed 
term AST, a new periodic tenancy comes into being on the same terms as those that applied 
to the fixed term AST, with the period of the new tenancy being determined by the original 
fixed term AST’s provisions concerning rent payment; (ie a 6 month fixed term AST with 
rent payable monthly becomes a monthly periodic AST). S.5 does not provide that the 
original tenancy acquires a new character; its effect much more bluntly is that the fixed term 
AST has ended and been replaced with a new periodic AST. This situation occurs with great 
regularity in the private rented sector, when the landlord and tenant who have been satisfied 
with the way the original fixed term has worked simply drift by default – and without really 
understanding what has happened in formal legal terms – into a new periodic relationship. 
 Relatedly, although here the scope for ignorance on the landlord and tenant’s part is less 
readily understandable, the grant of a new fixed term AST immediately on the expiry of the 
original fixed term AST also creates a wholly new tenancy; it does not in some fashion 
extend the terms of the original AST. 
 Consider then this scenario, which is hardly uncommon. L grants T a 12 month fixed term 
AST commencing on 01.03.2013 with the rent payable monthly; this is ‘tenancy 1’. Both 
parties are happy with the relationship and it continues beyond the 12 months without any 
new agreement being signed; thus from 01.03.2014 the parties have created ‘tenancy 2’. A 
few months later the parties agree that the rent be increased, and sign a new 12 month fixed 
term AST with effect from 01.07.2104; this is tenancy 3. When that expires on 30.06.2015, 
the parties are again content to let the arrangement continue; they thereby create ‘tenancy 4’ 
as a periodic monthly tenancy starting on 01.07.2015. From a Housing Act s.214 perspective, 
the (for the landlord) unhappy consequence of the landlord having failed properly to deal 
with per s.213 any deposit she/he might have taken at the commencement of tenancy 1 and 
having failed both to do so at any later point and to have returned the deposit, is that four 
tenancies are in play for the purpose of any damages claim.  
 As noted above, the effect of Housing Act 1988 s.5 within the tenancy deposit scheme was 
initially addressed in respect of a defence to s.21 proceedings in Superstrike. For present 
purposes, the essential elements of the reasoning in Superstrike are at paras 36-39: 
36 …... The 2004 Act has to be construed in the light of the provisions of the 1988 Act as regards assured 
shorthold tenancies, including section 5 . Once the new statutory periodic tenancy had come into being after the 
commencement date, a tenant's deposit being already held, it would be necessary to consider whether and if so 
how the 2004 Act applied. As I have said already, it must have been the claimant's position, by then, that it held 
the sum of £606·66 as a deposit as security for the performance of the defendant's obligations, or for the 
discharge of any liability of the defendant, arising under or in connection with the new tenancy. That could only 
be the correct legal position if that sum of money was to be treated as having been paid pursuant to the 
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defendant's obligation under the periodic tenancy to provide a deposit. That obligation only arose on the expiry 
of the fixed term tenancy, so the payment at the beginning of that fixed term cannot have given rise to the 
position which obtained once the fixed term had expired. Something must have happened in January 2008 which 
led to the result that the deposit was held in relation to the new tenancy. That something could have been either 
an actual…. payment (but none took place in this instance) or something which amounted to payment. If there 
was an actual payment or something treated as a payment there must also have been a corresponding receipt.  
37 If the parties had been aware of the true nature of the legal consequences in January 2008 of the expiry of the 
express fixed term tenancy without the defendant either giving up possession or entering into a new express 
tenancy agreement, they might have had a conversation or other exchange about the deposit, in which they 
agreed that the claimant should continue to hold the deposit, and that it should for the future be treated as the 
deposit under the new tenancy, instead of under the former fixed term tenancy… 
38 [A]lthough there is no evidence that the parties said or did anything of that kind….nevertheless the position 
as between them should be treated in the same way as if they had had such a discussion. The defendant should 
be treated as having paid the amount of the deposit to the claimant in respect of the new tenancy, by way of set-
off against the claimant's obligation to account to the defendant for the deposit in respect of the previous 
tenancy, given that the claimant did not seek payment out of the prior deposit for the consequences of any prior 
breach of the tenancy agreement. 
39 It follows that, on my analysis, the defendant did pay, and the claimant did receive, the sum of £606·66 by 
way of a deposit in respect of the new periodic tenancy in January 2008, and so the obligations under section 
213 of the 2004 Act applied to the deposit so received…… 
 
 The correctness of the Superstrike-derived argument for multiple tenancy liability is 
reinforced – if such were needed – by the amendment to the Act introduced in (s.214(2A)) 
which allows recovery even if ‘the tenancy’ has ended. It is entirely possible (one might think 
it quite likely) that the ‘intention’ behind the amendment was only to enable tenants who no 
longer had any landlord/tenant relationship at all with their former landlord to bring a claim, 
but the text of the amended Act does not lend itself to so limited a reading. Prima facie, 
s214(2A) bites firmly on the landlord and tenant who are (perhaps quite happily and quite 
unknowingly) on their third, fourth or fifth or more tenancy for tds purposes.  
 From the landlord’s perspective, there is a ‘better late than never’ dimension to this 
potentially very expensive problem. If our L in the scenario above had complied with 
s.213(3) and s.213(6) at the outset of tenancy 4, his/her s.214 liability would arise only in 
respect of tenancies 1-3 and would not be rekindled should there subsequently be a tenancy 5 
or 6 or 7 between the parties. 
 The reasoning in Superstrike and the text of s.214(2A) would not seem to permit any doubt 
about the correctness of this proposition. It has yet to be endorsed by a judgment in the higher 
courts, although there are now a few noted county court decisions where is has been applied; 
for example in Chaudry v Cooley
2
 and Kazardi v Martin Brooks Lettings.
3
 The next issue 
however is rather more complicated. 
 
 
Do breaches of s.213(3) and 213(6) found separate causes of action ? 
 
 A less compelling but not wholly implausible argument can be made that if,  as is likely in 
many cases the landlord has breached both s.213(3)  and s.213(6) then each breach may raise 
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 Brentford CC 09.06.2016 reported in Legal Action (2016; November p 40). 
  
3
 Edmonton CC 14.05.2015 reported in Legal Action (2015; September p51). 
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a separate cause of action. S.214(2)(a) clearly identifies these two types of breach as 
actionable for the purposes of damages. 
 S.213(3) requires the landlord to comply with all of the requirements of whichever 
authorised scheme he/she has chosen to use: 
 
s.213(3) Where a landlord receives a tenancy deposit in connection with a shorthold tenancy, the initial 
requirements of an authorised scheme must be complied with by the landlord in relation to the deposit within the 
period of 14 days beginning with the date on which it is received. 
 
Landlords currently have three schemes to choose from: the Deposit Protection Service 
(DPS); My Deposits; and the Tenancy Deposit Scheme (DPS).
4
 What most tenants and 
landlords might regard as the most important requirements of each scheme are that the 
deposit paid be protected and that the tenant be provided with a certificate confirming that 
fact. There is some overlap here with s.213(2)(b), which expressly refers to a deposit having 
to be held in accordance with the requirements of a scheme, and which presumably 
recognises that the requirements of a scheme per s.213(3) can encompass more than simply 
protecting the deposit.  
 S.213(6) requires the landlord to give the tenant certain prescribed information, which is 
detailed (and detailed in great detail) in the Housing (Tenancy Deposits) (Prescribed 
Information) Order 2007 SI No. 797: 
 
(6) The information required by subsection (5) must be given to the tenant and any relevant person— 
(a) in the prescribed form or in a form substantially to the same effect, and 
(b) within the period of 14 days beginning with the date on which the deposit is received by the landlord. 
 
 The relationship between s.213(3) and (6) is a little odd, since a failure to comply with 
s.213(6) will almost invariably mean that the landlord has breached s.213(3) as well, since  
providing (at least some of the prescribed information) is a requirement of the various 
schemes.  It is possible, though rather unlikely, that a landlord will comply with s.213(6) but 
not s.213(3). 
 The ambiguity raised by s.214(2)(a) is whether these distinct failures of compliance may be 
raised by the tenant in addition to each other rather than as alternatives. If this were not the 
case, very peculiar consequences would arise. That s.214(a) uses the word ‘or’ rather than 
‘and’ might suggest that a tenant can only plead one breach even if the landlord has breached 
both provisos. But that conclusion leads to a very odd result. 
 If the s.213(3) and (6) breaches are alternatives, then there can surely be no circumstances in 
which just one breach is proven that a court can award the maximum 3-x-deposit damages. 
This is because the nature of the breach must be less serious than if both s.213(3) and 
s.213(6) were breached, and presumably only the most serious
5
 breaches can trigger 3-x-
deposit liability. But s.214(4) imposes no such limitation. Prima facie, 3-x-deposit damages 
are payable for a claim which proves a breach of either s.213(3) or (6). 
 So in hypothetical Case A, involving the most serious breach of s.213(3), the court could 
make an award of 3-x-deposit damages. And in hypothetical case B, the most serious breach 
of s.213(6) can lead to an award of 3-x-deposit damages. But that would also mean that in 
case C, which involves the same breach of s.213(3) as in Case A and the same breach of 
s.213(6) as in Case B, that the court can still only award 3-x-deposit damages.  
 That would seem to be a nonsensical proposition, and not one to which the court is driven by 
the clear words of the Act. There is contrast nothing objectionable in principle about a 
                                                          
4
 See the guidance at https://www.gov.uk/tenancy-deposit-protection/overview. 
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 What this might mean is addressed further below. 
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landlord being liable in damages for both breaches if he/she/it has committed both breaches. 
A better way of making sense of the ‘or’ is that it is confirming that the tenant need not prove 
both breaches in order to recover, rather than restricting her to one cause of action if both 
breaches have occurred.  
 
 
Judicial discretion as to quantum 
 
 If the section above concerning whether s.214 creates one or two causes of action is 
incorrect, then in the case outlined above, the minimum damages the court could award is 5 x 
a single multiple of the £1000 deposit; ie £5000. The maximum is 5 x a triple multiple; ie 
£15,000. If the analysis above is correct, those figures can be doubled in appropriate cases. 
Either way, for both parties, there is much to play for in this area of judicial discretion. 
 There is little higher court authority on this question. Lawyers acting for either party would 
likely refer to Males J’s short judgment in Okadigbo v Chan6 [2014] EWHC 4729 (QB), 
where the deposit was protected 7 months late, in March 2013 rather than August 2102, and 
the prescribed information was not given until July 2013. That case upheld the lowest 
possible award of 1 x the deposit on the various bases that the landlords’ degree of 
‘culpability’ was a very important factor, and that here the culpability was low because, inter 
alia,: (a) There was late rather than no compliance: (b) The landlords were not experienced 
housing professionals; (c) The landlord had employed professional managing agents who had 
failed to comply with the deposit requirement.  
 It is unfortunate that Okadigbo was not taken to a further appeal, because the High Court’s 
reasoning is manifestly defective, and since it is the only High Court decision on the point it 
is likely exercising an unwelcome influence on the lower courts.  
 The first defect relates to the court’s readiness to allow the landlord to shelter behind the 
failure of his managing agent. There are four elements to this.  
 The first element, quite simply, is that the Act explicitly equates a managing agent with the 
landlord in s.212(9): 
(9) In this Chapter– 
(a) references to a landlord or landlords in relation to any shorthold tenancy or tenancies include references to a 
person or persons acting on his or their behalf in relation to the tenancy or tenancies…. 
 
So, bluntly put, the Act provides that agent’s failure is the landlord’s failure. The judgment in 
Okadigbo therefore ignores the plain words of the Act. 
 The second element is that there is an obvious route for the landlord to protect himself from 
the consequences of his agent’s shortcomings. If one is moved by the supposed ‘unfairness’ 
of the ingenue landlord being screwed over by his mendacious or incompetent agent then the 
remedy for the landlord is obviously to join the agent as a part 20 defendant and invite the 
court to impose any liability for damages on the agent.
7
 Any agency agreement will either 
make it clear the agent was responsible for ensuring compliance with the tds, in which event 
a part 20 indemnity will be easily achieved; or it will be silent about the tds in which event 
the landlord has no contractual basis to shift liability at all.
8
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 [2014] EWHC 4729 (QB). 
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 In principle the tenant could take this step herself, but given the phrasing of s.219 there is not good reason why 
she should. 
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 The third element runs on from the second. If a landlord in the Okadigbo position does post-
trial seek to recover the damages from the agent, the agent – who as a supposed ‘expert’ has 
completely failed to comply with the tds on the basis of what can at best be gross negligence 
– will be in the frame only for the lowest possible damages award. So it is not just the 
landlord who benefits from the agent’s failings, it is the agent as well. That seems to be a 
very peculiar outcome. 
 The fourth element is that the court’s reasoning completely ignores the perspective of the 
tenant. From that perspective, the severity of the breach is wholly unaffected by who is – in a 
moral sense – ‘to blame’ for the breach. The deposit has not been protected and/or the 
prescribed information not provided. The source of the failing(s) is irrelevant to their ipact on 
the tenant. 
 This shades into the second systemic defence in the Okadigbo reasoning, namely that it 
seems to focus solely on what we might term the mens rea rather than the actus reus of the 
breach. The scheme of the Act provides that even the most trivial breach of either s.213(3) or 
s.213(6) (ie a substantively tiny actus reus)
9
 must incur damages liability of 1 x the deposit: 
there is no de minimis exception. So, accepting that it is legitimate to take ‘culpability’ (ie the 
mens rea) into account, then the tiniest breach produced by the least culpable of landlords 
must still incur 1 x deposit liability. But the landlord’s breach in Okadigbo was far from tiny; 
it was complete non-compliance for a period which lasted far beyond the permissible time 
limits. If the landlord had complied with almost every requirement in the relevant time 
period, and then remedied nay breach just a day late, he/she would still have been liable to 
the minimum 1 x deposit damages. Seen in this light, Okadigbo makes no sense at all. 
 One might suggest a more structured approach to quantum could be adopted, in which the 
quantum moves from the minimum (1) toward the maximum (3) dependent upon the way in 
which the court classifies – on an equal weighting basis - both the actus reus and mens rea 
components of the non- compliance.  
 The actus resus element might have five components: de minimis; trivial; minor; substantial; 
and total. A de minimis breach leaves the multiple at 1; trivial moves it to 1.25; minor to 1.5; 
substantial to 1.75; and total to 2. One might then factor in the mens rea dimension, drawing 
distinctions perhaps between accidental, negligent and wilful non-compliance, and ranking 
those categories as adding respectively 0, 0.5 and 1 to the multiple. This approach offers 
twelve potential outcomes, each reflecting the cumulative seriousness of the extent of and 
reason for the landlord’s breach of the scheme, which are laid out in table 1 below. At one 
extreme, 1 x deposit can only apply to the most trivial of breaches by the least culpable of 
landlords. At the other, 3 x deposit can apply only to the most egregious of breaches by the 
most culpable of landlords. 
 
[Insert table 1] 
 
Conclusion 
 
 The thus far undeveloped state of the law on the post 2015 tds can have little do with the 
infrequency with which disputes arise, because they surely arise on a regular basis. A more 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
8
 It is perhaps arguable that in the absence of a contractual obligation the landlord could raise an economic loss 
claim in tort against the agent on a Hedley-Byrne basis. Again however, there is no reason why that should be of 
concern to the tenant. 
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 Such as for example complying a day late, or failing to provide one or two of the very detailed bits of 
information required by the Housing (Tenancy Deposits) (Prescribed Information) Order 2007 (S.I. 2007/797). 
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contextual factor is the likely explanation. A tenants will only qualify for legal aid to press an 
argument about the tds if she is doing so in response to a possession claim brought by her 
landlord. The cynical but obviously sensible strategy for any landlord to adopt when a s.21 
and/or rent arrears possession claim is met with a well-founded tds defence and counterclaim 
from a legally-aided tenant is to discontinue the claim. The counterclaim will remain live of 
course, but the formerly legally-aided tenant will now be a litigant in person or at best be 
getting pro bono representation to pursue the counterclaim. Many tenants might in such 
circumstances simply give up the counterclaim entirely or accept a modest settlement. It 
would seem likely that few of those tenants would be well-placed to argue the multiple 
tenancy or twin heads of liability points, or to argue the toss in court about whether to depart 
from the minimalist Okadigbo approach to damages. Nor, since it will rarely be the case that 
potential damages exceed the small claims threshold, could tenants expect to find skilled 
representation on a conditional fee basis.  
 What is likely need to bring the matter back before the higher courts is a ground 8 rent 
arrears claim where the 8 week/2 month threshold will be beaten only if the tenant recovers 
very substantial tds damages at a higher level than awarded at trial. In those circumstances, 
the tenant’s eligibility for legal aid will continue, both because her home would be at stake 
and because there would be a wider public interest in clarifying the law. There are 
presumably some such cases lining up in the lower courts, but it may be some time before 
one of them reaches a level that attracts a wider audience. 
 
 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Table 1; Quantifying quantum in the tenancy deposit scheme 
 
Actus reus  
 
De minimis   1.00   1.50   2.0 
 
Trivial                    1.25   1.75   2.25 
 
Minor   1.50   2.00   2.50 
 
Substantial   1.75   2.25   2.75 
 
Total    2.00   2.50   3 
 
 
   Accidental  Negligent  Wilful  Mens rea 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
